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Abstract
We study how domestic content requirements in Free Trade Areas (FTAs) affect
market power and market structure in concentrated intermediate goods markets.
We show that content requirements increase oligopolistic markups beyond the level
that would obtain under an equivalent import tariff, and we document patterns in
Canadian export data and US producer price data that align with the model’s pre-
dictions: producers of intermediate goods charge comparatively higher prices when
the associated final goods producers are more constrained by FTA origin require-
ments and by Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs for both intermediate and final
non-FTA goods.
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1 Introduction
Free Trade Areas (FTAs) typically impose origin requirements as a condition for goods
originating in a member country to be exportable to another member country without
incurring a tariff. These rules of origin (ROOs) are meant to prevent importers of goods
originating outside the FTA from using trans-shipments within the FTA as a way of
minimizing payments of customs duties, but in practice they can translate into excessive
protection of domestic producers of intermediate goods. This has been well documented
both theoretically (Krishna and Krueger, 1995; Falvey and Reed, 2002; Krishna, 2005;
Bombarda and Gamberoni, 2013) and empirically (Conconi et al., 2018).1
This paper studies how the domestic content requirements imposed by FTAs affect
competition and prices. Our contribution is twofold. First, in a model of oligopolis-
tic competition between producers of differentiated intermediate goods, we show that
binding and stricter content requirements under oligopoly are associated with higher
markups and more firm entry. These effects could dampen the well-documented pro-
competitive effects of preferential trade liberalization, and should thus be factored in
when assessing the pros and cons of alternative preferential trade arrangements.2 Sec-
ond, we verify our theoretical predictions empirically by focusing on the 1989 Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), using both Canadian trade data and
US Census data. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to document such
effects for FTAs both in theoretical and empirical terms.
The broader debate on how different types of trade barriers may produce different
effects on market outcomes is an old one, but has traditionally been restricted to the
comparison between tariffs and quotas. The main conclusion is that price-based in-
struments (such as tariffs) and quantity-based instruments (such as quotas) produce the
same effects under conditions of perfect competition but not so if competition is im-
perfect (Bhagwati, 1965).3 Under monopoly, for example, a quota removes a portion
of domestic demand faced by a domestic monopolist, but its monopoly pricing power
remains unchanged for the residual portion of demand. In contrast, trade in the pres-
ence of a tariff fully removes the monopoly power of the sole trader by comparison with
autarky.
As a trade barrier, ROOs cannot be readily slotted into either category—they are nei-
ther price-based nor quantity-based. We argue here that they indeed amount to a hybrid
1For welfare implications, see Krueger’s (1997) survey on FTAs with ROOs versus Customs Union; and
Brenton and Manchin (2003) for a discussion of implications for small developing countries such as the
Balkans’ FTAs with the EU. Lloyd (1993) also argues that using a tariff on value added produced outside
the FTA would be more efficient than using ROOs.
2See Krueger (1999) for a review of the relevant literature.
3Krishna (1989) has also shown how quantity-based trade barriers can facilitate collusion.
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between the two types of instruments. Specifically, we show that a regional value content
(RVC) requirement can result in partial market segmentation, lowering the elasticity of
demand for domestic intermediates produced within the FTA. When the market for in-
termediate inputs is oligopolistic (rather than monopolistically competitive), the lower
demand elasticity can be shown to give rise to higher markups. In turn, absent barriers
to entry, higher markups encourage inefficient entry. These effects on prices and mar-
ket structure go beyond those that would be implied by an equivalent tariff barrier—a
tariff that has the same effect on the volume of intermediate goods imports—because
a tariff does not fundamentally change the elasticity of demand faced by suppliers of
intermediate inputs.
Our theoretical analysis generates three main testable predictions. The first is that
markups should be higher under a binding domestic content requirement than they are
in its absence. The second is that a given content requirement is more likely to be bind-
ing the larger is the required level of domestic content, the smaller are Most Favoured
Nation (MFN) input tariffs, and the larger are MFN output tariffs. To see why, assume
there is absolutely free trade between FTA partners while there are non-zero MFN tariffs
applied to non-FTA trading partners. High MFN input tariffs would induce final good
producers to opt for inputs of FTA origin irrespective of input requirements, making
the input requirement less likely to be binding. On the other hand, if MFN tariffs on
final goods are non-negligible, obtaining origin status for final goods and being able to
export them at zero tariff to other FTA regions has positive value for FTA producers. In-
tuitively, a more binding content requirement makes FTA producers of final goods more
willing to pay a premium for intermediate inputs originating within the FTA, translating
into greater pricing power for oligopolistic producers of intermediate inputs operating
within the FTA.
The role origin requirements play in support of oligopolistic markups in turn lim-
its the pro-competitive effects of preferential trade liberalization: absent barriers to en-
try/exit, the number of intermediate goods producers remains inefficiently higher, and
their size remains inefficiently smaller, than would be the case under a preferential trade
agreement that does not incorporate ROOs—our third prediction.
To test these predictions empirically, we focus on the 1989 CUSFTA and construct a
novel product-level index that measures ROOs restrictiveness based on the input-output
linkages in CUSFTA’s rules of origin constructed by Conconi et al. (2018).4 We first use
4CUSFTA came into force in January 1989 and was superseded by the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 with the addition of Mexico. Our choice of CUSFTA over NAFTA is mo-
tivated by the fact that over 95% of NAFTA’s rules of origin were already in place in CUSFTA (Conconi
et al., 2018). Another advantage is that it enables us to draw a clear distinction between preferential and
external MFN tariff rates, as during our sample period of 1989-1993 both Canada and the US had no other
FTA partners (with the only exception being the 1985 US-Israel agreement).
2
monthly province-level trade statistics from Statistics Canada for the period of 1989-
1993, and provide post-CUSFTA evidence that stricter and binding RVC requirements
are associated with higher export unit values for Canadian exports to the US in compar-
ison with exports of comparable products to other destinations (by roughly ten percent
on average). Such gap can be interpreted as reflecting a differential markup applied
by Canadian intermediate goods exporters on sales to FTA producers (who face origin
requirements).5 To relate price changes to ROOs in comparison with the pre-CUSFTA
levels, we turn to annual US PPI data for manufacturing industries from the US Bureau
of Labor Statistics, matched with concentration measures (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,
HHI) from the Economic Census for identifying market structures for the years of 1987
and 1992. In difference-in-difference specifications, we find strong support for our the-
oretical predictions, and we show that our findings apply to only oligopoly industries,
consistent with our theoretical setup.
This paper builds on and contributes to the literature that examines how different
trade policies may impact on market power and firm entry. A large body of literature
has documented a pro-competitive effect under imperfectly competitive market struc-
tures and showed that trade liberalization reduces markups, both theoretically (Melitz
and Ottaviano, 2008) and empirically (Levinsohn, 1993; Harrison, 1994; Feenstra and
Weinstsein, 2017).6 It has also been well-documented that trade liberalization can lead
to exit by the least productive firms exit the market: see Pavcnik (2002) for the case of
Chile, and Trefler (2004) for the case of CUSFTA.7 Our contribution here is in showing
that binding rules of origin under oligopolistic competition generate the opposite ef-
fects in terms of markups and firm entry, and therefore should not be neglected when
assessing the impact of FTAs.
Among the papers that examine the effects of rules of origin, most are theoretical
papers that focus on the protection of domestic producers of intermediate goods. Ju
and Krishna (2002; 2005) are probably the first studies to formalize how ROOs could
affect the prices of intermediate goods in the FTA region. In a framework with inelas-
tic supply and perfect substitution between FTA and non-FTA inputs, they document a
non-monotonic effects due to demand shifts for FTA inputs, depending on whether het-
5It should be noted that although Canada is a much smaller economy than the US, it is the largest
export market for US producers—US exports to Canada account for 21.52% of total US exports in 1989
and the share remains steady to date at around 20%—and Canada is also one of the largest suppliers
to the US —US imports from Canada account for roughly 18% of annual total US imports from 1989 to
2002 before slowly dropping to about 12% in 2018. This means that origin requirements do matter to US
producers of final goods.
6Other studies that have contributed to this debate are Cox and Harris (1985), Head and Ries (1999),
and Caliendo and Parro (2015).
7For a survey of both theory and empirics on heterogeneous firms and trade, see Melitz and Redding
(2014).
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erogeneous firms choose to comply with ROOs. Our paper differs from theirs by study-
ing how ROOs affect trade prices via changes in market power and markups rather than
through decreasing returns in production.
Empirical attempts to measure the restrictiveness of ROOs in different industries and
evidence of their trade effects have been scarce. One notable example is Conconi et al.
(2018) who provide a mapping of input-output product linkages of ROOs in NAFTA
and CUSFTA, upon which our ROO measures are based.8 Their focus, however, is on
how NAFTA ROOs lead to significant reductions in imports of intermediate goods from
third countries relative to NAFTA trading partners, rather than on the effects of ROOs
on prices. A study that examines effects on both trade volumes and prices is Romalis
(2007), which documents a substantial boost in trade between NAFTA partners but only
a modest increase in relative output prices of traded goods between NAFTA members
versus the rest of the world for very protected sectors with high MFN tariffs. His struc-
tural estimations, however, do not account for ROOs. Our paper complements these
studies by providing evidence on how ROOs affect trade prices for intermediates, em-
ploying a novel measure of ROO tightness that accounts for variations in the levels of
protection across traded goods.9
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present our main
theoretical framework. In Section 2, we demonstrate how content requirements in ROOs
result in partial market segmentation and lower the elasticity of demand facing domestic
producers of intermediates. In Section 3, we introduce oligopolistic competition and
analyze the effects on prices, markups and market competitiveness. Section 4 describes
our data and presents results of our empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes. Proofs of
theoretical results are in the appendix.
2 Content requirements and input choice
We develop our arguments for a scenario with a regional value content (RVC) require-
ment, which is by far the most widely adopted form of ROOs across the FTAs we ob-
serve, and study a setting with two identical trading regions.
Producers of final goods in each region use symmetrically differentiated varieties
of intermediate inputs, some of which are produced by domestic suppliers and some
of which are produced by foreign suppliers. There is an equal number, N, of these
8See also Estevadeordal (2000) for a categorization of the restrictiveness of ROOs coded from 1 (least
restrictive) to 7 (most restrictive).
9Our study is also related to work on pricing to market and markup adjustments using customs data
(Knetter, 1989; Corsetti et al., 2018). Although our empirical analysis has a different focus, it addresses
similar issues in controlling for observable marginal costs with trade prices derived from customs data.
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suppliers in each region. Production takes place via CES technologies:
y(q) =
(
2N
∑
j=1
qj(σ−1)/σ
)σ/(σ−1)
, (1)
where qj is input of the intermediate good produced by supplier j. The corresponding
unit cost is
e(p) =
(
2N
∑
j=1
pj1−σ
)1/(1−σ)
, (2)
where the pj’s are unit prices for each of the symmetrically differentiated inputs and
σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between them.
Consider first a scenario where N = 1, i.e. there is a single supplier of intermediates
in each region. Let pD denote the price of domestically produced intermediates for a
representative producer in one of the two regions, and pM the price of imported inter-
mediates (inclusive of any trade costs). Absent any constraint, unit cost can be written
as
e(pD, pM) =
(
pD1−σ + pM1−σ
)1/(1−σ)
. (3)
This is the minimum cost, at prices pD and pM, of a combination of inputs s.t.(
qD(σ−1)/σ + qM(σ−1)/σ
)σ/(σ−1)
= 1. (4)
The conditional demand for a representative domestic intermediate and a representative
imported intermediate, using Shephard’s Lemma, can then be expressed as
qD(pD, pM) =
∂e(pD, pM)
∂pD
= e(pD, pM)
σ pD−σ,
qM(pD, pM) =
∂e(pD, pM)
∂pM
= e(pD, pM)
σ pM−σ. (5)
Suppose now that domestic producers face an RVC requirement: a certain propor-
tion, r, of the value of their input must be sourced within the FTA region for their output
to be sold to FTA buyers at zero tariff; if this requirement is not met, then they must also
incur the same trade costs internally as they do for sales to non-FTA buyers. Satisfying
an RVC requirement of r implies that, to produce a unit of the final good, the final good
producers must choose a combination of intermediate inputs that achieves the required
output target for the given technology and such that, at the given prices, an input value
share of at least r consists of goods produced within the FTA. As we shall show, this is
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equivalent to employing a technology featuring less substitutability between domesti-
cally sourced and foreign sourced intermediates than the elasticity of substitution that
is implied by technology only.
Assume first that the domestic content requirement is unconditional, i.e. that it must
be met whether or not the producer wishes to be able to sell its output without facing a
tariff. If this is binding, we can write
pD qD
pD qD + pM qM
≥ r, (6)
From this, we obtain
qD =
r
1− r
pM
pD
qM = q˜D(pD, pM, qM, r). (7)
We can substitute this expression into (4), solve for qM = qˆM(pD, pM, r), and then substi-
tute again into (7) to derive an expression for qD = qˆD(pD, pM, r). We obtain conditional
demands under a binding RVC constraint as:
qˆD(pD, pM, r) = r pD−1 eˆ(pD, pM, r),
qˆM(pD, pM, r) = (1− r) pM−1 eˆ(pD, pM, r), (8)
where
eˆ(pD, pM, r) =
(( pD
r
)(1−σ)/σ
+
( pM
1− r
)(1−σ)/σ)σ/(1−σ)
(9)
is unit cost under a binding RVC constraint.
Comparing equation (9) with the expression for unconstrained unit cost in (3), we can
see the 1− σ in the first expression being replaced by (1− σ)/σ in the other (which also
features share parameters); so it would seem that a binding content requirement simply
implies a lower elasticity of substitution—the value σ̂, s.t. 1− σ̂ = (1− σ)/σ. In this
case, however, Shephard’s Lemma does not apply (i.e. qˆD(pD, pM, r) 6= ∂eˆ(pD, pM, r)/∂pD
and qˆM(pD, pM, r) 6= ∂eˆ(pD, pM, r)/∂pM).
Next, we turn to develop the binding conditions for the RVC requirement. Consider a
conditional requirement for sales of final goods to FTA destinations: an ad valorem tariff
at rate tI is levied on intermediates that are traded across regions, and an ad valorem
tariff at rate tF is levied on final goods that are traded within regions but are produced
without satisfying the domestic content requirement. Also, let τI = 1 + tI , τF = 1 + tF,
and pM = τI pW , where pW is the net-of-tariff price charged by foreign exporters of
intermediates.
Absent an RVC constraint, regional value content would be pDqD/e(pD, pM), which
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using (5), equals
(
1 + (pM/pD)1−σ
)−1 ≡ ρ(pD, pM), and so the constraint is only bind-
ing for r ≥ ρ(pD, pM). For r = ρ(pD, pM), RVC-constrained unit cost eˆ(pD, pM, r) equals
unconstrained unit cost e(pD, pM); for r > ρ(pD, pM), we have eˆ(pD, pM, r) > e(pD, pM),
and the gap between them increases with r. This binding condition r ≥ ρ(pD, pM) can
then be expressed as an upper bound of input tariff:
τI ≤ (pD/pW)
(
r
1− r
)1/(σ−1)
≡ (pD/pW) ξ(r) ≡ τ I(r). (10)
Moreover, if satisfying the domestic content requirement is a condition for the producer
to be able to sell its good without incurring an ad valorem tariff at rate tF within the FTA
region, then abiding by the content requirement should minimize overall unit cost. This
condition can be expressed as a lower bound of output tariff:
eˆ(pD, pM, r) < τF e(pD, pM) ⇔ τF ≥ eˆ(pD, τI pW , r)e(pD, τI pW) ≡ τF(r, tI) ≥ 1, (11)
where the last inequality follows from eˆ(pD, τI pW , r) ≥ e(pD, τI pW). Otherwise overall
unit cost will be minimized by producing the final goods ignoring the content require-
ment and incurring the tariff, and so, while the conditionality requirement will still be
binding, the RVC constraint as such will cease to be binding.
Thus, over the full range of possible price combinations and tariff levels, unit cost
equals
B(r, τI , τF) eˆ(pD, τI pW , r) +
(
1− B(r, τI , τF)
)
e(pD, τI pW) ≡ e˜(pD, τI pW , r), (12)
where B(r, τI , τF) ≡ 1 τF ≥ τF(r,tI) 1 τI ≤ τ I(r), with 1 denoting an indicator function. In
other words, a regional content requirement is only binding for producers of final goods
(and thus affects their choice between domestic and imported inputs) if tariffs on im-
ported inputs are sufficiently low and if exports that do not meet the content require-
ments face sufficiently high tariffs.
3 Oligopolistic markups under a regional input require-
ment
We now turn to the analysis of the effects of an RVC requirement under oligopoly in
the context of a symmetric model with four economies and two FTAs. Agents in each
economy are endowed with a certain amount, L¯, of a non-produced, immobile factor
(the same amount in both regions). In a symmetric equilibrium the price of the immobile
factor will be equalized across economies, and so we can normalize this price at the
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outset to be unity in all economies. Two of these economies are members of an FTA and
the remaining two are members of a separate FTA, each denoted by h ∈ {1, 2}.
Focusing on a single industry, we assume that the total value of demand originating
from any given economy for final goods produced by this industry is equal to a fraction,
θ L¯, θ ∈ (0, 1), of total income in each country, and that the value of demand for goods
originating in each of the four economies is one-quarter of that, i.e. θ L¯/4 ≡ M. This
specification is consistent with Cobb-Douglas substitution possibilities in final demand
across industries and between domestically produced final goods and imported final
goods.
Producers of intermediate goods produce symmetrically differentiated inputs using
only the non-produced factor at a constant marginal cost of c and incurring a fixed
cost equal to F, and operate under conditions of oligopoly, each pricing its output non-
cooperatively so as to maximize gross profits.
3.1 Equilibrium markups
We first examine the case where there is a fixed number, N/2, of active intermediate
goods producers in each economy, i.e. N producers of intermediate goods in each FTA.
The implications of free entry are examined in the next section. Without loss of general-
ity, we assume a constant marginal cost of c = 1.
Intermediate goods and final goods traded across the two regions of the FTA face ad
valorem tariffs at rates respectively equal to tI and tF, the same for all economies. The
same tariff applies to final goods traded between economies of an FTA if produced in
a way that does not satisfy regional content requirements. Intermediate goods traded
across economies of an FTA face no tariffs. Final goods meeting content requirements
and traded across economies of an FTA face no tariffs. There are no other trade costs
beyond tariffs. The requirement that producers of final goods must meet in order to be
able to export their goods within an FTA at zero tariff is an RVC input requirement at
level r.
Absent a content requirement, the unit cost of production for a representative pro-
ducer of final goods in region h is e(pDh, pMh) ≡ Ph, where
pDh =
( N
∑
j=1
(
pjh
)1−σ)1/(1−σ), pMh = ( N∑
j=1
(
τI p
j
h′
)1−σ)1/(1−σ). (13)
with pjh and p
j
h′ denoting the-net-of-tariff prices charged by each supplier of intermedi-
ates indexed by j in each of the two FTAs.10 The levels of demand faced by a represen-
10This implies horizontal input differentiation; i.e. e(pDh, pMh)=
(
∑j
(
pjh
)1−σ
+∑j
(
τI p
j
h′
)1−σ)1/(1−σ).
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tative supplier of intermediate goods, j, originating from producers of final goods in the
FTA to which they belong and from the other FTA are then respectively equal to
qjDh =
(
M
Ph
+
M
τFPh
) (
Ph
pDh
)σ ( pDh
pjh
)σ
= M (1 + 1/τF) e(pDh, pMh)σ−1
(
pjh
)−σ,
qjXh =
(
M
Ph′
+
M
τFPh′
) (
Ph′
pMh′
)σ( pMh′
τI p
j
h
)σ
= M (1 + 1/τF) e(pDh′ , pMh′)σ−1
(
τI p
j
h
)−σ;
(14)
and so its net profits are
Πjh = (p
j
h − 1)
(
qjDh + q
j
Xh
)
− F = µjh
(
qjDh + q
j
Xh
)
− F, (15)
where µjh ≥ 1 represents a markup factor on marginal cost.
Given the pricing choices of all other suppliers, the profit maximizing pricing choice
of a representative supplier of intermediates satisfies
∂Πjh
∂pjh
= 0. (16)
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have µjh = µ
j
h′ = µ, ∀j, and so the profit maximization
condition for a representative supplier from either region is
∂Πjh
∂pjh
∣∣∣∣∣
µ
j
h=µ
j
h′=µ, ∀j
≡ Ω(µ, N) = 0. (17)
Solving for the optimal markup µ, we obtain
µ∗ = 1 + 1
σ− 1
N
N −Φ(τI) , (18)
where
Φ(τI) ≡
(
1 + (1 + τI)/(τI1−σ + τIσ)
)−1
< 1. (19)
Note that the markup is increasing in τI . For τI = 1 (i.e. with a zero tariff on imports
of intermediates), Φ(τI) equals 1/2 and so the denominator of the second ratio in (18)
equals N − 1/2. For τI approaching infinity and σ > 1, Φ(τI) approaches unity and so
the denominator of the second ratio in (18) equals N − 1.
Under a binding domestic content requirement, we can proceed in the same way and
use (8) and (9) to derive expressions for the levels of demand and profits:
9
qˆjDh =
(
M
Pˆh
+
M
τFPˆh
)
r
(
Pˆh
pDh
) (
pDH
pjH
)σ
= M r (1 + 1/τF)
(
pDh
)σ−1 (pjh)−σ,
qˆjXh =
(
M
Pˆh′
+
M
τFPˆh′
)
(1− r)
(
Pˆh′
pDh′
)(
pDh′
τ pjh
)σ
= M (1− r) (1 + 1/τF)
(
pDh′
)σ−1 (
τ pjh
)−σ, (20)
Πˆjh = µˆ
H
j
(
qˆjDh + qˆ
j
Xh
)
− F, (21)
where Pˆh = eˆ(pDh, pMh, r). We can then use these to derive a symmetric profit-maximiza-
tion condition, Ωˆ(µˆ, Nˆ) = 0. Solving this condition for µ gives
µˆ∗ = 1 + 1
σ− 1
N
N − 1. (22)
Comparing this expression with unconstrained markup in (18) gives us our first testable
prediction:
Proposition 1 Equilibrium markups are higher under a binding domestic content requirement
than they are in its absence.
(Proofs of theoretical results are in the appendix.)
The RVC constraint is more likely to be binding, and thus markups more likely to
be higher, the larger is r. However, in order for the pricing behaviour described by (22)
to correspond to equilibrium behaviour, it is not enough for the RVC constraint to be
binding when all producers price in this way; it must also be the case that there are not
unilateral price deviations that can make the constraint slack and be gainful. As shown
in the proof of our next result, this latter condition is the one that defines the necessary
lower bound on r, although the same conclusion applies, i.e. the larger r, the more likely
the RVC constraint is to bind:
Proposition 2 A given domestic content requirement is more likely to be binding for producers
of final goods (and thus to raise equilibrium markups for producers of intermediates) the larger is
the required level of domestic content, with the lowest level of domestic content above which the
requirement is binding lying strictly above the unconstrained domestic content level.
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As previously discussed, for the RVC constraint to be binding, we must have τI ≤
τ I(r) (condition (10)), where
τ I(r) = ξ(r) =
(
r
1− r
)1/(σ−1)
. (23)
Moreover, satisfying the domestic content requirement is only cost-minimizing for pro-
ducers of final goods (and thus to be binding for them) if τF ≥ τF(r, tI) (condition (11)),
where
τF(r, τI) =
((
1
r
)(1−σ)/σ
+
(
τI
1− r
)(1−σ)/σ)σ/(1−σ) / (
1 + τ1−σI
)1/(1−σ). (24)
Our next result follows immediately from (23) and (24):
Proposition 3 A given domestic content requirement is more likely to be binding for producers
of final goods (and thus to raise equilibrium markups for producers of intermediates) the larger
are tariffs on imports of non-FTA final goods and the smaller are tariffs on imports of non-FTA
intermediate inputs.
A testable implication of these results is that, for a given τF, we should expect to see
larger markups when r is comparatively higher and, simultaneously, τI is comparatively
lower.
3.2 Domestic content requirements as an import barrier
It is easy to show that a domestic content requirement acts as a trade barrier on imports
of intermediates: letting τI = 1 (zero import tariffs) and comparing, for a representa-
tive firm, the net-of-tariff equilibrium values of trade in intermediate goods across FTA
boundaries that obtain with and without a domestic content requirement, which are
respectively equal to pˆ qˆX = pˆ
j
h qˆXh = pˆ
j
h′ qˆXh′ and pqX = p
j
h qXh = p
j
h′ qXh′ , by using
expressions (13)-(22), we obtain
pˆ qˆX − p qX = M (1 + 1/τF)N (1/2− r), (25)
which is negative for r > 1/2.
However, this conclusion does not mean that introducing a domestic content require-
ment is fully equivalent to introducing a tariff, as the former produces different effects
on markups and market structure:
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Proposition 4 Under oligopolistic competition between suppliers of intermediate inputs, a
binding domestic content requirement raises markups more than does an import tariff that, ab-
sent a content requirement, produces the same same effect on imports of intermediates.
The effects of content requirements on the markups and profits of import-competing
producers thus go beyond those of trade barriers that have comparable effects on trade
flows. And, conversely, in order to generate effects on markups and profits that are
comparable to those of a content requirement, a tariff must produce larger effects on
trade flows.11
3.3 Free entry
If entry and exit are free and costless, the number of active intermediate goods produc-
ers will adjust endogenously so that profits, net of the fixed operating cost, are zero in
equilibrium, i.e.
Πjh
∣∣∣
µ
j
h=µ
j
h′=µ, ∀j
≡ Π(µ, N) = 0. (26)
Conditions (17) and (26) then together identify an equilibrium number of firms, N∗:
N∗ =
(M/F)
(
1 + τIσ
)2
+ (σ− 1) (τI + τI2σ)
σ
(
1 + τIσ
) (
τI + τIσ
) . (27)
The corresponding number of firms under a binding domestic content requirement is
Nˆ∗ =
(M/F)
(
1 + r(τI − 1)
)
+ (σ− 1) τI
σ τI
, (28)
which is increasing in r. Expressions for equilibrium markups, as a function of the num-
ber of firms, are as before.
The same ranking of markup levels that applies for an exogenously given N applies
under conditions of free entry, but the equilibrium number of active firms is higher
under a binding RVC constraint:
Proposition 5 Under conditions of free entry, both the equilibrium level of markup and the
equilibrium number of suppliers of intermediate inputs are higher under a binding domestic
content requirement than they are in its absence.
11In particular, the same level of markups that would obtain under autarky can be supported by a
binding domestic content requirement that does not fully restrict trade: since σ > 1, the gap between
µˆ∗ and µ∗ vanishes as as τI approaches infinity (and trade in intermediate goods approaches zero); i.e.
the level of markup under an origin requirement coincides with the level of markup under a prohibitive
import tariff.
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The results that we have first derived for an exogenous number of firms thus extend
to a setting where the number of active firms varies with the size of markups. However,
under free entry, the model additionally predicts that a domestic input requirement will
encourage entry. A well established result in the literature, which applies under fairly
general conditions, is that oligopolistic competition produces excessive entry, translat-
ing into a sub-optimal firm size (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991). By encouraging entry, a
domestic input requirement will exacerbate this.
As noted in the introduction, the implications of preferential trade liberalization for
market structure have been the subject of a large literature. The theoretical experiment
considered in those studies is to characterize the effects of a move from a pre-agreement
scenario to a zero bilateral-tariff scenario, an exercise that is typically carried out in a
monopolistic competitive setting where, with symmetric firms, there are no scale ef-
fects if demand is derived from CES preferences or technologies. Under oligopolistic
competition—the environment we focus on here—the elasticity of demand, and thus
markups, vary with the number of firms even when preferences and technologies are
of the CES type, and so preferential liberalization can generate positive scale effects and
firm exit. On the other hand, Proposition 5 implies that ROOs in FTAs will tend to limit
the pro-competitive effects of preferential trade liberalization.
4 Empirical analysis
Our theoretical analysis has shown that the implications of FTA origin requirements
for market power lie somewhere in between those of import tariffs and import quo-
tas. While rules of origin do not segment demand as rigidly as import quotas do, they
still generate a degree of market segmentation. Under oligopolistic competition, if the
constraint is binding, this translates into higher markups. Because of this, rules of ori-
gin do not just distort input decisions by firms, causing firms to substitute away from
non-FTA inputs and acting as a de facto import barrier, but they also generate inefficient
entry. The effects of origin requirements on market power go beyond those that would
be generated by an import tariff that supports a comparable contraction in intermediate
imports.
Evidence that rules of origin act as a trade barrier has been given elsewhere (Conconi
et. al, 2018). Here we specifically look for evidence of a relationship between markups
and origin requirements. Focusing on Canadian exports over the period 1989-1993,
which follows the formation of the 1989 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
(CUSFTA), we compare prices for exports to the US (where exporters of final goods
face CUFSTA’s regional content requirements) with export prices to non-CUSFTA des-
tinations. This means that we examine evidence arising from a situation in which FTA
counties trade with each other as with other non-FTA countries, whereas the markup
13
expressions (18) and (22) have been derived with reference to a scenario involving two
symmetric FTAs. However, proceeding as we did in Section 3, it is easy to show that the
same expressions, and the same conclusions, apply to an asymmetric scenario involving
a single FTA trading with the rest of the world, with FTA-based oligopolistic producers
of intermediate goods pricing their exports to perfectly competitive non-FTA markets at
marginal cost.
Another aspect where our empirical analysis veers from the theoretical setting of
Section 3 is with respect to the form of content requirements: while most FTAs prescribe
a value-based input requirement as we have characterized it in our theoretical analysis,
CUSFTA imposes specific input requirements prescribing 100% FTA origin for selected
types of inputs. Our theoretical analysis assumes a single type of differentiated inputs,
but can be readily extended to allow for multiple types of inputs. In that case a 100% in-
put requirement for a specific input would correspond to imposing an RVC requirement,
r, that approaches unity for that input, and all of our our predictions and conclusions
continue to apply.12 At the same time, while value-based requirements often impose a
single RVC ratio for most goods, the peculiar structure of CUSFTA content requirements
implies substantial variation in content requirements across different goods, which we
can exploit in our empirical application. Our theoretical predictions that stricter and
binding ROOs are associated with higher markups should also apply to US domestic
prices of intermediate goods that are used for producing final products qualified for
preferential CUSFTA tariffs.
We provide cross-validation for the results from our main analysis by document-
ing how changes in US Producer Price Indices (PPI) for different goods between 1987
(pre-CUSFTA, in the absence of regional content requirements) and 1992 (post-CUFSTA,
when regional content requirements were in place), as well as the changes in the num-
bers of firms producing those goods, vary with the stringency of ROOs and the size of
MFN tariffs.
4.1 Evidence from trade data
Data and descriptive statistics
We rely on monthly product-level trade statistics from Statistics Canada for a sample of
Canada’s exports over the period of 1989-1993. Annual tariff data and all other trade
data are from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS).
Information on monthly exports data includes the 6-digit HS classification of product
12In this case, for a given input type h, unit cost becomes limr→1 eˆh(phD, p
h
M, r
h) = 21/(σ−1) phD, and the
formulation we have derived for the case r ∈ (0, 1) provides an approximation to a scenario with multiple
input types and 100% domestic content requirements applying to a subset of input types representing a
fraction r of all input types (assuming symmetric substitution amongst those input types).
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codes, the province of origin, the value, the mass, the unit of measurement, the time of
exports (year and month), and the destination country. Given that export prices are not
observed, we proxy export prices with unit values computed as the ratios between the
value and the corresponding mass at the monthly frequency.13
We clean up the data in several ways. First, we drop those observations for which the
value of exports is indicated as positive but the corresponding mass is zero or undefined.
Second, we aggregate the data at an annual frequency by computing the yearly average
of unit values for each observation at the province×product×country level. Finally, to
minimize the influence of potential outliers, we exclude the 0.5 percent of observations
with the largest and smallest log differences in unit values between FTA and non-FTA
regions (our dependent variable)—one percent of all observations in total.
We construct a ROO index for our baseline analysis based on the mapping of CUS-
FTA’s rules of origin constructed by Conconi et al. (2018). For each intermediate good
defined in CUSFTA’s rules of origin, we derive a weighted count of the number of fi-
nal goods that require that input to be of FTA origin in order to qualify for FTA status,
with the weight being equal to Canada’s trade share in US exports of that final good
multiplied by the number of other regional inputs that are also included in the origin
requirement for that final good. We then standardize the index at the 2-digit HS indus-
try level and normalize it to lie in the range of zero to unity. This ROO index measures
the overall restrictiveness imposed by origin requirements when sourcing a certain in-
termediate good used to produce final goods that qualify for preferential tariffs.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for our main sample involving only intermediate
inputs (for industrial use) that are defined in CUSFTA’s rules of origin.14 As shown in
the table, our sample includes 1,633 intermediate products and 203 destination countries
(including the US) with a total of 63,813 observations. On average, unit values and
transaction values are slightly higher for US-bound exports than for exports to the rest of
the world. Table 1 also shows the distributions of CUSFTA’s preferential tariffs and MFN
tariffs, as reported by the US. Overall, CUSFTA’s preferential tariffs are significantly
lower on average, and although many products face a zero rate, trade barriers within
CUSFTA are not completely eliminated.
In the sample, the same goods are exported to both the FTA region (the US, which
accounts for 87 percent of total exports) and the non-FTA destinations (the rest of the
13The data contain 18 very detailed units of measurements. These include, for example, KGM (kilo-
gram), NMB (number), TNE (Metric tonne), MTK (square metre), TMQ (1,000 cubic metres), TSD (metric
tonne air dry), LTR (litre), and PAR (pair). With this additional information we are able to measure unit
values more correctly.
14The 1989-1993 trade data include 2,657 products in total, among which 1,633 are intermediate goods,
667 are consumption goods, 348 are capital goods and 9 are undefined. Results for consumption and
capital goods can be found in Table 6. Good classification is based on the Broad Economic Categories
(BEC).
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Table 1: Canadian exports: summary statistics
Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
Observations 63,813 – – – –
Products 1,633 – – – –
Destination countries 203 – – – –
Log unit values (Canadian dollar): US 3.2 2.84 2.86 −4.35 14.66
Log unit values (Canadian dollar): non-US 2.95 2.33 2.89 −5.19 15.98
Log transaction values: US 15.3 15.57 2.94 4.8 22.77
Log transaction values: non-US 10.82 10.55 2.51 0.69 21.43
Preferential ad valorem tariffs (percent) 2.4 0.77 4.03 0 78.4
MFN ad valorem tariffs (percent) 4.61 3.45 5.66 0 86.74
Notes: For each variable, the table reports its mean, median, standard deviation, and the minimum and
maximum values.
Figure 1: ROO Index: Distribution
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Table 2: Average ROO index for exported products by area of destination
Mean Std. dev. Observations
Africa 0.284 0.149 3,760
Asia 0.276 0.134 19,396
Europe 0.273 0.140 21,591
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.319 0.151 10,574
Oceania 0.292 0.140 3,111
South America 0.294 0.143 5,381
Total 0.285 0.142 63,813
Notes: For each area, the table reports the mean and standard deviation of the ROO index, and the
number of observations. Statistics for the US correspond to those of the full sample.
world), with a broad coverage of destination countries. The largest market in the non-
FTA region is Japan (25.16 percent), followed by the UK (7.32 percent), China (5.71
percent), Germany (5.26 percent), South Korea (5.24 percent), Belgium (3.55 percent),
Netherlands (3.36 percent), and Italy (3.36 percent).
Figure 1 plots the distribution of the main variable of interest, the ROO index. As the
index is standardized at the industry level, and the composition of exports tends to vary
by destination, there could be systematic variation across different destination regions.
These results are presented in Table 2. Overall, the ROO index appears to be evenly
distributed across different destinations.
Empirical strategy
To test our theoretical predictions, we first run the following regression:
∆pitnc = α0 + α1 DTBi × DRHi + α2 DTBi + α3 DRHi +~αTΛ Λit + δnc + δct + εitnc , (29)
where ∆pitnc ≡ ln pitn,US − ln pitn,c is the difference in log unit values for good i origi-
nating in province n between exports to the US and exports to country c in year t; DRHi
is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the ROO index is above the median and
zero otherwise.15 To capture the binding criteria in the forms of tariffs, we introduce
a dummy variable DTBi that takes the value of one (and zero otherwise) if (i) the input
tariff gap of good i between the US’s external MFN and preferential tariffs is below an
arbitrary threshold of the sample median, and (ii) the output tariff gap of final goods
associated with good i between Canada’s MFN and preferential tariffs is above an arbi-
15We first consider specifications with a discrete categorization of high versus low ROO index, rather
than the index itself, for easier interpretation of the coefficients. As a robustness check, we then consider
specifications that directly incorporate the continuous ROO index (see Appendix B).
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trary threshold of the sample median.16 As our focus is on the prices charged by Cana-
dian exporters to US importers of intermediate inputs, the relevant MFN input tariffs
are those that apply to competing imports of intermediate goods into the US from non-
FTA regions. And as US final goods producers are the ones facing origin requirements,
the relevant MFN output tariffs are those that apply to competing imports of final goods
into Canada from non-FTA regions.17
We also include fixed effects δnc to control for province×destination-specific factors
affecting the cost or quality of exports—e.g. selection effects arising from variation in
the relative incidence of transportation costs by distance (the so-called Alchian-Allen
effect)—and δct to control for time-variant and destination-specific macro variables such
as income and exchange rates. Two further controls are included in Λit: these are PTit
(time-varying), for product trends such as quality upgrading, and initial MFN tariffs
for good i, MFNi (time-invariant), to account for possible selection effects, whereby in-
puts originally facing high input tariffs could be more likely to be included in CUSFTA’s
content requirements. All regressions are weighted by relative trade values, so that ob-
servations with higher trade shares relative to the US would be assigned higher weights.
This specification directly relates to the prediction of Proposition 1, which says that
markups should be higher under a binding domestic content requirement than they are
in its absence. Our dependent variable is meant to proxy for markup differences for a
given product from the same province between markets in the US and non-FTA trading
partner, c. Thus, an estimate of α1 that is significantly greater than zero indicates that
stricter and more likely to be binding content requirements for a product (DRHi = 1
and DTBi = 1) are associated with higher unit value gaps (i.e. higher gaps in markups)
between exports to FTA and non-FTA destinations.18 We also test whether conditional
on tariffs being binding, predicted ∆ pˆitnc is significantly different between high ROO
index (DTBi = 1, D
RH
i = 1) and low ROO index (D
TB
i = 1, D
RH
i = 0).
To test the predictions of Propositions 2 and 3—stating that a given content require-
ment is more likely to be binding the larger is the required level of domestic content, the
smaller are input tariffs, and the larger are output tariffs—we use continuous tariff rates
interacted with the ROO index, ROIi, in the following specification:
∆pitnc = β0 + β1 ROIit × ∆T Iit + β2 ROIit × ∆TOit + β3 ROIit + β4 ∆T Iit + β5 ∆TOit
+~βTΛ Λit + δnc + δct + εitnc , (30)
16We then relax or tighten these thresholds with the 25th percentile or the 75th percentile for both tariffs.
Later, in robustness checks, we turn to identify actual binding criteria by industry.
17In robustness checks, we carry out a placebo test to show that MFN output tariffs facing US exporters
of final goods do not matter.
18We later carry out diagnostics to ensure that price gaps are not driven by systematic quality differen-
tials (see Table 5).
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where ROIi measures the restrictiveness of CUSFTA’s content requirements for good i as
previously defined, ∆T Iit is the input tariff gap for good i between the external MFN rates
and the preferential tariffs facing US importers in year t, and ∆TOit is the average output
tariff gap between external MFN rates and the preferential tariffs faced by Canadian
importers in year t for all final goods associated with intermediate input i.19 We include
the same fixed effects and controls as in specification (29). Propositions 2 and 3 predict
that β1 < 0 and β2 > 0.
Results
Panel A of Table 3 reports estimates for specification (29) using our main sample (i.e.
including all intermediate goods defined in CUSFTA’s ROOs). In columns (1)-(3) of
Table 3, we begin with median values (P50) for both tariffs as binding thresholds; these
build up to our preferred specification in column (4) with different combinations of fixed
effects.
We first interpret our results qualitatively, focusing on our preferred specification
in column (4). We can see that the main coefficient of interest is significantly greater
than zero (αˆ1 = 0.247 > 0), which indicates that stricter and more likely to be binding
content requirements (with median values as thresholds for both tariffs and the ROO
index) are associated with higher unit value gaps between FTA and non-FTA regions.
This is consistent with Proposition 1. Note that when goods fall into the binding tariffs
group (DTBi = 1), they also face lower input MFN tariffs. When ROOs for these goods
are not restrictive (DRHi = 0), this translates into more competitive pressure from non-
FTA sources, which could explain the lower unit value gap (αˆ2 = −0.233 < 0). Also
note that it is not the ROO requirement alone, but rather its interaction with the tariff
binding criteria, that is associated with higher unit value gaps (as αˆ3 = −0.15 < 0).
In column (5), we consider stricter tariff binding thresholds, using the 25th percentile
(P25) for input tariff gaps and the 75th percentile (P75) for output tariff gaps. As ex-
pected, the estimated gap of unit values is wider (αˆ1 = 0.394 > 0), suggesting stronger
market power of Canadian exporters under more strictly binding content requirements.
In column (6), where we consider more liberal tariff binding thresholds with P75 for
input tariff gaps and P25 for output tariff gaps, the estimated coefficient becomes in-
significant. By the logic of our theoretical analysis, this is to be expected under more
loosely defined binding criteria.
For easier quantitative interpretation of our results, we report in Panel B the total
predicted effects on ∆ pˆitnc for each group of high ROO index (DRHi = 1) versus low
ROO index (DRHi = 0) and whether tariffs meet binding criteria (D
TB
i = 1, and D
TB
i = 0
otherwise). Focusing on column (4) again, we compare the differences between the first
19Using trade weighted output tariffs does not change our results.
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Table 3: Rules of origin and unit export values: binding tariff and ROO thresholds
Dep. variable: ∆pitnc P50, P50 P50, P50 P50, P50 P50, P50 strict P25, P75 liberal P75, P25
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Estimates
DTBi × DRHi 0.363a
(0.042)
0.364a
(0.042)
0.241a
(0.043)
0.247a
(0.043)
0.394a
(0.11)
0.005
(0.029)
DTBi −0.241a
(0.022)
−0.233a
(0.023)
−0.247a
(0.023)
−0.233
(0.023)
a −0.072
(0.084)
−0.067a
(0.02)
DRHi −0.154a
(0.016)
−0.166a
(0.016)
−0.144a
(0.016)
−0.15a
(0.016)
−0.13a
(0.015)
−0.113a
(0.023)
Panel B: Predicted ∆ pˆitnc
DTBi = 1, D
RH
i = 1 0.299
a
(0.037)
0.301a
(0.036)
0.174a
(0.04)
0.164a
(0.04)
0.506a
(0.074)
0.131a
(0.025)
DTBi = 1, D
RH
i = 0 0.091
a
(0.019)
0.103a
(0.02)
0.077a
(0.029)
0.067
(0.03)
b 0.242a
(0.087)
0.24a
(0.027)
DTBi = 0, D
RH
i = 1 0.177
a
(0.011)
0.17a
(0.011)
0.18a
(0.021)
0.151a
(0.023)
0.184a
(0.022)
0.193a
(0.028)
DTBi = 0, D
RH
i = 0 0.332
a
(0.012)
0.336a
(0.011)
0.324a
(0.016)
0.3a
(0.018)
0.314a
(0.018)
0.306a
(0.018)
FE: province×country No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
FE: country×time No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 63,813 63,813 63,813 63,813 63,813 63,813
R2 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
Notes: Country×product trends and the initial MFN tariffs as controls are included but not reported. All
columns are weighted with relative trade values of good i in year t between the US and the non-FTA
partner c. Columns (1)-(4) use P50 for both tariffs as binding thresholds. Column (5) uses stricter binding
thresholds, P25 for input tariff gaps and P75 for output tariff gaps. Column (6) uses more liberal binding
thresholds, P75 for input tariff gaps and P25 for output tariff gaps. a indicates significance at the one
percent level, and b indicates significance at the five percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the
product×country level.
two rows to see the effect of content requirements on unit value gaps, conditional on
tariffs being binding (DTBi = 1). On average, goods with a high ROO index (above
median) have roughly ten percentage points higher unit value gaps between FTA and
non-FTA export markets, compared to those with low ROO index. The actual predicted
difference is 0.097 (= 0.164− 0.067) and significant at the five percent level (p = 0.0228).
Alternatively, we can interpret this result as a roughly ten percent higher absolute unit
value for exports to the US versus exports to other destinations (i.e., pitn,US/pitn,c) for
those goods that have a higher ROO index relative to those with a lower ROO index.20
On the other hand, when tariffs are not likely to be binding (comparing rows 3 and
4 in column (4)), more restrictive content requirements are associated with lower unit
value gaps between FTA and non-FTA export markets. The difference is significant at
20Denote with pˆ1 ≡ pitn,US/pitn,c the predicted absolute unit value ratio for the high ROO index group
(DTBi = 1 & D
RH
i = 1) and with pˆ2 the corresponding ratio for the low ROO index group (D
TB
i = 1 &
DRHi = 0). We can derive the predicted value for ( pˆ1 − pˆ2)/ pˆ2 as (e0.097 − 1) ≈ 0.1019.
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the one percent level (p < 0.0001). This result further strengthens our theoretical finding
that it is the restrictiveness of content requirements interacted with binding tariffs, rather
than the ROO index alone, that drives up unit value gaps.
Similar to the results in Panel A, in column (5) with stricter tariff binding thresholds,
we can see that the estimated gap of unit values is wider, at roughly 25 percentage points
(= 0.506 − 0.242) and significant at the five percent level, again suggesting stronger
market power of Canadian exporters under more strictly binding content requirements.
In column (6) with more liberal tariff binding thresholds, the result is now reversed
and resembles the non-binding group. Overall, our results in Table 3 provide strong
evidence that stricter and binding content requirements are associated with higher unit
value gaps, in line with Proposition 1.
Results for specification (30) are reported in Table 4. Columns (1)-(3) build up to our
main specification, reported in column (4). Estimated coefficients are βˆ1 = −13.23 < 0
and βˆ2 = 9.577 > 0. These results offer evidence in support of Propositions 2 and
3, which predict that a domestic content requirement is more likely to be binding the
larger is the ROO index, the smaller are input tariffs, and the larger are output tariffs,
resulting in higher unit value gaps between FTA and non-FTA regions. Notice again
that a higher ROO index itself is not necessarily associated with a higher unit value gap,
as the coefficients for the ROO index is mostly insignificant.
Our interpretation of these unit value gaps as reflecting gaps in markups, however,
hinges on exports to the US and exports to other destinations containing goods of similar
quality. The inclusion of dummies for combinations of province of origin and destina-
tion country controls for systematic variation in quality that is associated with different
areas of origin or destinations but is common across products. But there may still be
variation in quality that is product-and-destination specific. To check that our results
are not driven by higher quality products (proxied by higher prices) being shipped to
the US whereby unit value gaps ∆pitnc are always positive, we derive estimates, in col-
umn (1) of Table 5, for a sub-sample of goods that feature negative unit value gaps. In
column (2) we report results for the opposite case where unit values are always higher
for exports to the US. Results are robust for both sub-samples.
In column (3) of Table 5 we also report estimates for a restricted sub-sample that only
includes exports to advanced economies with more homogeneous product quality.21
In column (4), we only include exports to developing economies, defined as all other
countries excluding advanced ones in column (3), and find that the output tariff channel
21As defined by the IMF, the 39 advanced economies are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Is-
rael, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Portugal, Puerto Rico, San Marino, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Taiwan, the UK, and the US.
21
Table 4: Rules of origin and unit export values: using ROO index
Dep. variable: ∆pitnc (1) (2) (3) (4)
ROIit × ∆T Iit −10.602a
(2.372)
−11.97a
(2.473)
−12.097a
(2.516)
−13.23a
(2.578)
ROIit ×∆TOit 10.563
(2.589)
a 11.144
(2.607)
a 9.175
(2.76)
a 9.577
(2.763)
a
ROIit −0.013
(0.085)
−0.048
(0.09)
0.032
(0.086)
0.013
(0.09)
∆T Iit 6.562
a
(0.708)
6.764a
(0.736)
5.514a
(0.729)
5.593a
(0.92)
∆TOit −1.003
(0.804)
−1.202
(0.81)
−1.653
(0.826)
b −1.683
(0.828)
b
FE: province×country No Yes No Yes
FE: country×time No No Yes Yes
Observations 63,813 63,813 63,813 63,813
R2 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06
Notes: Country×product trends and the initial MFN tariffs as controls are included but not reported. All
columns are weighted with relative trade values of good i in year t between the US and the non-FTA
partner c. a indicates significance at the one percent level, and b indicates significance at the five percent
level. Standard errors are clustered at the product×country level.
Table 5: Rules of origin and unit export values: controlling for quality differentials
Dep. variable: Neg. ∆pitnc Nonneg. ∆pitnc Advanced Developing Excl. Mexico Top 10 partners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROIit × ∆T Iit −4.541a
(1.48)
−21.518a
(3.17)
−18.947a
(3.898)
−7.1b
(2.77)
−13.119a
(2.613)
−17.194a
(5.54)
ROIit ×∆TOit 6.213
(1.759)
a 10.719
(3.058)
a 14.747
(4.161)
a 3.712
(3.164)
9.462
(2.802)
a 16.782
(6.098)
a
ROIit −0.177a
(0.058)
0.133
(0.12)
0.148
(0.132)
−0.169
(0.105)
0.025
(0.091)
0.172
(0.171)
∆T Iit −0.697
(0.446)
8.779a
(0.941)
7.716a
(1.125)
3.043a
(0.838)
5.451a
(0.756)
7.398a
(1.571)
∆TOit −2.145a
(0.574)
−1.219
(0.953)
−2.558b
(1.223)
−0.842
(1.029)
−1.616b
(0.838)
−3.686b
(1.687)
FE: province×country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE: country×time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,585 34,228 34,100 26,713 62,576 19,653
R2 0.09 0.1 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.06
Notes: Country×product trends and the initial MFN tariffs are included as controls but not reported. All
columns are weighted with relative trade values of good i in year t between the US and the non-FTA
partner c. a, b, and c indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. Standard
errors are clustered at the product×country level.
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becomes insignificant. Our results are also robust to omitting Mexico (Canada’s second
FTA trading partner via NAFTA) from the sample, in column (5). Finally, in column (6)
we find very similar results when we include only Canada’s top ten trading partners
(other than the US) by export shares.22
An alternative way of controlling for quality gap is by including province×product
fixed effects, which allows for province-specific price gaps between FTA and non-FTA
goods for a particular product. Our results are robust to this change (see Appendix B).
Given that product differentiation translates into more market power for producers,
effects on markups should be more evident in markets for differentiated goods. Table 6
reports results obtained from specification (30) with a further dummy variable DGCi to
capture good characteristics based on the Rauch classification for product heterogeneity
(Rauch, 1999) and the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification for the main end-
use of products.23
In column (1) of Table 6 we compare Rauch reference priced goods (DGCi = 1) with
non-reference priced goods (DGCi = 0). We would expect market power to be more
relevant, and thus our results to hold, for non-reference priced goods. We can see that
this is indeed the the case: we obtain βˆ1 < 0 and βˆ2 > 0 for non-referenced priced
goods, whereas for reference priced goods these coefficients are either insignificant or do
not have the expected sign. Similarly, in column (2) we consider Rauch homogeneous
goods (DGCi = 1) versus differentiated goods (D
GC
i = 0); and again coefficients are
significant and of the expected sign only for non-homogeneous products. Overall, these
findings are consistent with the notion that product differentiation confers more market
power.
Guided by our theoretical predictions, our main analysis has focused on intermedi-
ate goods used to produce final goods qualifying for FTA preferential tariffs. In column
(3) we also include BEC consumption and capital goods originally excluded from our
sample. Here the dummy variable DGCi takes a value of one for consumption and cap-
ital goods and zero otherwise (which corresponds to our main sample).24 We find that
the interactions between the ROO index and tariffs have no statistical significance, con-
sistently with the theoretical prediction that ROOs should alter market power only for
goods that are used as manufacturing inputs.
22These partners include: Japan, United Kingdom, China, Germany, South Korea, Belgium, Nether-
lands, Italy, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and France.
23The Rauch classification categorises goods according to three types: differentiated products, refer-
ence priced goods, or homogeneous goods. The BEC classification categorizes goods into three types:
intermediate goods for industrial use, capital goods or consumption goods.
24Note however that the coefficients do not coincide with those in column(4) in Table 4 because we do
not allow fixed effects to vary by DGCi .
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Table 6: Rules of origin and unit export values: good characteristics
DGCi : Rauch D
GC
i : Rauch D
GC
i : BEC capital
Dep. variable: ∆pitnc reference priced homogeneous & consum. goods
(1) (2) (3)
ROIit × ∆T Iit × (DGCi = 1) −2.315
(2.87)
13.5
(9.018)
−3.893
(2.949)
ROIit × ∆T Iit × (DGCi = 0) −29.839a
(3.388)
−24.331a
(3.26)
−12.636a
(2.462)
ROIit ×∆TOit × (DGCi = 1) −12.02
(2.67)
a −40.138
(10.64)
a −2.822
(2.707)
ROIit ×∆TOit × (DGCi = 0) 27.306
(3.386)
a 12.68
(3.003)
a 10.44
(2.742)
a
ROIit × (DGCi = 1) −0.089
(0.084)
0.507b
(0.221)
0.625a
(0.071)
ROIit × (DGCi = 0) 0.072
(0.114)
0.02
(0.096)
−0.084
(0.079)
∆T Iit × (DGCi = 1) 4.803a
(1.031)
−2.549
(0.67)
3.083a
(0.95)
∆T Iit × (DGCi = 0) 6.964a
(0.888)
7.912a
(0.94)
6.035a
(0.723)
∆TOit × (DGCi = 1) 2.817a
(1.06)
0.691
(1.821)
0.035
(0.807)
∆TOit × (DGCi = 0) −4.617a
(0.973)
−2.234b
(0.976)
−2.143a
(0.831)
FE: province×country Yes Yes Yes
FE: country × time Yes Yes Yes
Observations 63,813 63,813 117,276
R2 0.07 0.07 0.05
Notes: Country×product trends and the initial MFN tariffs as controls are included but not reported. All
columns are weighted with relative trade values of good i in year t between the US and the non-FTA
partner c. a indicates significance at the one percent level, and b indicates significance at the five percent
level. Standard errors are clustered at the product×country level.
Further robustness checks
Appendix B reports a whole battery of robustness checks, focusing on industry-level
evidence and alternative samples and fixed-effects specifications. Overall, the patterns
we find are supportive of our main findings.
In Table B1 of Appendix B, we report results for a variant of specification (29) in
which the ROO dummy variable is replaced by the actual ROO index, ROIi. These
results are consistent with those reported in Table 3.
To check that our results are not driven by the industry composition of our sample
but rather by the interactions between tariffs and the restrictiveness of content require-
ments, we identify industry-specific binding thresholds using rolling regressions. Using
these more precisely-defined thresholds does not qualitatively change our main findings
(Tables B2-B4).
Our results are robust to excluding from our sample products which had high initial
MFN tariffs above the median tariffs (Table B5, column (1)). This addresses a potential
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concern about selection: industries that were initially protected by high tariffs might
have lobbied more for protection through ROOs in CUSFTA negotiations. We also show
that our results are robust to a longer sample period of 1989-2000 (Table B5, column
(2)). As a placebo test, we replace the MFN output tariffs with WTO tariffs (for US
exports), and confirm that what matters for the market power of Canadian exporters
of intermediate goods are indeed the CUSFTA preferential rates relative to Canada’s
MFN rates (Table B5, columns (3)-(4)). What tariffs other WTO members levy on US
products is of no consequence. Finally, we run our main specification (30) with a sub-
sample of differentiated goods including a series of additional fixed effects, including
(i) province×country×time fixed effects to control for province-destination specific and
time-variant cost shocks, (ii) province×pro-
duct fixed effects to further control for province specific quality gaps between FTA and
non-FTA for a given product, (iii) industry×country fixed effects, to take into account
other cost factors that may be specific to an industry, and (iv) province×product×country
fixed effects to account for country specific tastes for a specific province×product pair.
All these results reported in Table B6 are in line with those reported in Table 4.
4.2 Evidence from US Census data
Data and descriptive statistics
We combine annual US PPI data for manufacturing industries from the US Bureau of
Labor Statistics, with industry-level concentration measures (Herfindahl-Hirschman In-
dex, HHI), values of shipments and total number of firms from the Economic Census.
All these data use the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). After dropping industries
with no products defined in CUSFTA’s ROOs, our full sample covers 334 industries at
the 4-digit SIC level out of the total of 440 in manufacturing sector (SIC 20-39).
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics of these 334 SIC industries. PPI changes be-
tween 1987 and 1992 average to about 13.57 percent (at the minimum and maximum,
PPI changes are −31.69 percent and 45.41 percent, respectively).25 We also report the
distribution of the ROO index, as previously defined, but weighted at the SIC level.26
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) ranges between 4 and 2,830 with a mean of 671.
We also report changes from pre- to post-CUSFTA firm numbers and sales. On average
firm numbers barely increase (an increase of about 0.57 percent) but there is variation
25An obvious caveat in this exercise is that we cannot separate intermediate inputs from final goods. In
our empirical specification, we address this issue with fixed effects at the SIC 2-digit level as industries
in the same SIC 2-digit sector are likely to have similar good characteristics in terms of the end-use of
products.
26For how the weighted ROO index is calculated, see equation (31) for details.
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Table 7: PPI and market concentration: summary statistics, US industries (SIC)
Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Observations 334 – – – –
PPI change (%), 1987-1992 13.57 14.07 0.09 −31.69 45.41
ROO index 0.32 0.28 0.12 0 1
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 671 461 610.06 4 2,830
Firm number change (%), 1987-1992 0.57 2 0.19 −146.63 53.41
Sales change (%), 1987-1992 17.25 18.28 0.21 −72.15 113.17
Notes: For each variable, the table reports its mean, median, standard deviation, and the minimum
and maximum values.
across industries (the minimum implies firm exit by 150 percent and the maximum im-
plies firm entry by 53 percent). Sales grow by 17.25 percent on average, but growth rates
differ across industries (the minimum and maximum being −72.15 percent and 113.17
percent, respectively).
Empirical strategy
Information on PPIs is used to run the following specification:
PPI_Changej = γ0 + γ1 ROIj×∆T Ij + γ2 ROIj×∆TOj + γ3 ROIj + γ4 ∆T Ij + γ5 ∆TOj
+ γ6 N_Changej + γ7 Share_Changej + δSIC_2j + ej, (31)
where PPI_Changej ≡ ln(PPIj, 92)− ln(PPIj, 87) is the log change of PPI from 1987 (pre-
CUSFTA) to 1992 (post-CUSFTA) for industry j, ∆T Ij is the weighted average of post-
CUSFTA (1989-92) input tariff gaps for industry j between the external MFN rates and
preferential tariffs (facing US importers), and ∆TOj is the weighted average of post-
CUSFTA output tariff gaps between MFN and preferential rates of all final goods as-
sociated with industry j’s intermediate inputs (facing Canadian importers).27 Similarly
to (30), ROIj represents a weighted average of the ROO index defined in the main anal-
ysis.28
We also add two control variables N_Changej ≡ ln(Nj, 92)− ln(Nj, 87) as the log change
of firm numbers and Share_Changej ≡ ln(Sharej, 92)− ln(Sharej, 87) as the log change of
27Note that pre-CUSFTA tariff gaps would be zero (as preferential tariffs did not exist prior to CUFSTA),
and so our approach is akin to a diff-in-diff analysis. Post-CUSFTA tariff changes are used as additional
controls (see column (3) of Table 8).
28For both tariffs and the ROO index, we use trade shares as weights to convert from the HS 6-digit
to SIC 4-digit level. The weight assigned to each HS product is calculated with its export share within
a given SIC industry during the sample period. Using import shares as weights does not qualitatively
change the results.
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shipment value between the years of 1987 to 1992. Fixed effects are included at the SIC
2-digit level to account for sector-specific factors that could affect marginal costs. The
whole regression is weighted by Canada’s share in US exports of final goods associ-
ated with industry j’s products used as intermediate inputs, which reflects the relative
importance of CUSFTA’s rules of origin in industry j’s pricing decisions.29
We further interact all variables with a dummy for industries with high HHI indi-
cating market structures closer to oligopoly as assumed in our theory, and we test the
theoretical predictions that γ1 < 0 and γ2 > 0 for oligopoly industries.
Results
Table 8 reports results from specification (31). In column (1) of Table 8, we begin with a
binding sub-sample using an arbitrary binding criteria of P75 for input tariff gaps and
P25 for output tariff gaps.30 We can see that, even without distinguishing between mar-
ket structures, the coefficients have the expected signs—the first two rows have γ1 < 0
and γ2 > 0—but only one of them is significant at the 5% level. In columns (2)-(5)
we interact all variables with a dummy which takes the value of one if the industry’s
HHI in 1987 was above 1,800 (Olig = 1). This gives thirty-five oligopoly industries.31
Results from our main specification are reported in column (2) and show that stricter
and binding ROOs are associated with higher prices for oligopoly industries only, of-
fering evidence in support of our theoretical prediction that effects should be stronger
in oligopolistic markets. It is also worth noting that firm entry significantly lowers
prices for oligopoly industries only, whereas higher value of shipments is associated
with higher prices only for non-oligopoly industries. In column (2), with our preferred
specification, a 10% increase in firm numbers is associated with a price drop of 7.5 per-
centage points (= 0.746× 100%× 0.1) for oligopoly industries.
In column (3), we further control for post-CUSFTA tariff changes, including log
changes in both input and output tariffs from 1989 to 1992, and our results remain very
similar to those in column (2). In column (4) we use stricter binding criteria and observe
larger magnitudes for both coefficients γ1 and γ2 for oligopoly industries only.32 In col-
umn (5) we consider looser criteria and our results remain robust. Finally, in column (6)
we use a lower HHI threshold for defining oligopoly industries (giving us now seventy
29Using Canada’s share in US imports of intermediate goods yields very similar results.
30Recall that lower input tariffs and higher output tariffs make ROOs more binding. Here we choose a
relatively loose criteria to remove industries facing tariff rates that are unlikely to be binding (i.e. exclud-
ing industries facing very high input tariffs and very low output tariffs at the same time).
31Using the 1992 HHI yields very similar results.
32Note that for output tariffs, P25 corresponds to one percentage point difference between the external
MFN and FTA preferential rates. Any stricter threshold would eliminate too many observations so we
keep P25 for output tariffs.
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Table 8: Rules of origin and US PPIs
HHI≥1200
Dep. variable: PPI_changej HHI≥1800 as oligopoly as oligopoly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROIj × ∆T Ij −1.472
(4.48)
– – – – –
ROIj × ∆TOj 20.823b
(10.383)
– – – – –
ROIj × ∆T Ij × (Olig = 1) – −104.37a
(34.709)
−104.2a
(35.012)
−917.11a
(254.897)
−121.85a
(43.015)
−68.44b
(31.511)
ROIj × ∆T Ij × (Olig = 0) – 1.587
(3.967)
1.617
(3.948)
8.403
(9.753)
−2.651
(3.609)
0.16
(4.002)
ROIj × ∆TOj × (Olig = 1) – 209.31a
(71.993)
209.14a
(74.887)
420.78a
(82.948)
94.11a
(34.978)
177.08a
(51.26)
ROIj × ∆TOj × (Olig = 0) – 15.362c
(8.687)
15.548c
(8.786)
28.923
(17.65)
13.11b
(6.127)
15.244c
(8.483)
N_changej −0.08c
(0.041)
– – – – –
Share_changej 0.124
a
(0.043)
– – – –
N_changej × (Olig = 1) – −0.746
(0.209)
a −0.747
(0.213)
a −1.437
(0.273)
a −0.185
(0.187)
−0.304
(0.17)
c
N_changej × (Olig = 0) – −0.06
(0.4)
−0.063
(0.4)
−0.073
(0.479)
−0.041
(0.36)
−0.061
(0.41)
Share_changej × (Olig = 1) – 0.206
(0.135)
0.207
(0.099)
−0.153
(0.173)
0.064
(0.111)
0.211b
(0.1)
Share_changej × (Olig = 0) – 0.109
(0.04)
a 0.109
(0.04)
a 0.081
(0.049)
0.082
(0.036)
b 0.102b
(0.043)
Binding criteria P75, P25 P75, P25 P75, P25 P50, P25 P90, P25 P75, P25
FE: Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls: Tariff changes No No Yes No No No
Observations 191 191 191 129 232 191
R2 0.31 0.4 0.44 0.53 0.38 0.38
Notes: Constant terms and the variables ROIj,∆T Ij ,∆T
O
j are included but not reported. All columns are
weighted with Canada’s share in US exports of final goods associated with industry j’s products used as
intermediate inputs. a indicates significance at the one percent level, b indicates significance at the five
percent level and c indicates significance at the ten percent level. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
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oligopoly industries) and, overall, our results still hold.
4.3 Rules of origin and firm entry
In this section we provide evidence in support of the theoretical prediction that the equi-
librium number of suppliers of intermediate inputs should be higher under a binding
domestic content requirement than in its absence (Proposition 5)—i.e. that rules of origin
encourage entry. To relate ROOs to changes in firm numbers pre- versus post-CUSFTA,
we use US census data described in Section 4.2 and run the following specification (anal-
ogous to (31)):
DFNj = θ0 + θ1 ROIj × ∆T Ij + θ2 ROIj × ∆TOj + θ3 ROIj + θ4 ∆T Ij
+ θ5 ∆TOj + θ6 Share_Changej + δSIC_2j + ej, (32)
where DFNj is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the percentage change
of firm numbers from 1987 (pre-CUSFTA) to 1992 (post-CUSFTA) for sub-industry j (at
SIC 4 digit level) lies above its broader industry mean (at SIC 2 digit level) and zero
otherwise. The reason for focusing on relative rather than absolute changes in firm
numbers is that we wish to isolate the differential effects of differential ROOs from the
first-order effects on industry composition triggered by the introduction of CUSFTA. By
using this empirical strategy, we can measure the comparative effects of CUSFTA on firm
entry across sectors facing differential ROOs within a broad industry.
All other variables in specification (32), as well as trade weights given to each indus-
try j to reflect the relevance of rules of origin, are as defined in (31). And as (32), we
further interact variables with a dummy for industries with high HHI indicating mar-
ket structures closer to oligopoly as assumed in our theory, and we test the theoretical
predictions that θ1 < 0 and θ2 > 0 for oligopoly industries. Table 9 reports estimation
results.
In column (1) of Table 9, we report results for a sub-sample of binding cases using an
arbitrary binding criteria of P75 for input tariff gaps and P25 for output tariff gaps. We
can see that without distinguishing market structures, the coefficient is as expected and
significant for output tariff (see the second rows that θ2 > 0) but not for input tariff. In
columns (2)-(4) we interact all variables with a dummy which takes the value of one if
the industry’s HHI in 1987 was above 1,800 (Olig = 1). Results from our main specifi-
cation are reported in column (2) where we confirm that stricter and binding ROOs are
associated with relatively higher firm entry for oligopoly industries only (see the first
two rows that θ1 < 0 and θ2 > 0). Notice that in our sample, 8 out of 20 industries at SIC
2 digit level (or 150 out of 334 sub-industries at SIC 4 digit level) experienced an average
drop in firm numbers (see Table 7). Our results thus suggest that for these industries,
sub-industries that have been comparatively more sheltered by tight rules of origin have
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Table 9: Rules of origin and firm entry
HHI≥1500 HHI≥1200
Dep. variable: DFNj HHI≥1800 as oligopoly as oligopoly as oligopoly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROIj × ∆T Ij 14.801
(33.68)
– – – – –
ROIj × ∆TOj 225.31a
(64.66)
– – – – –
ROIj × ∆T Ij × (Olig = 1) – −181.41a
(49.54)
−194.82a
(46.01)
−159.34a
(50.67)
−161.644c
(90.29)
−99.84
(90.4)
ROIj × ∆T Ij × (Olig = 0) – 4.917
(27.17)
11.437
(31.38)
7.723
(23.13)
2.473
(27.48)
−0.968
(27.6)
ROIj × ∆TOj × (Olig = 1) – 587.92a
(153.53)
656.407a
(153.29)
581.9a
(89.21)
615.9a
(163.99)
651.46a
(156.49)
ROIj × ∆TOj × (Olig = 0) – 151.6c
(72.85)
143.514c
(82.67)
100.5a
(34.93)
134.668c
(68.07)
113.57c
(64.67)
Share_Changej 0.649
a
(0.165)
– – – – –
Share_Changej × (Olig = 1) – −0.209
(0.232)
−0.23
(0.241)
−0.099
(0.134)
−0.298
(0.207)
−0.143
(0.11)
Share_Changej × (Olig = 0) – 0.811
(0.223)
a 0.803
(0.231)
a 0.841a
(0.232)
0.82
(0.192)
a 0.916a
(0.198)
Binding criteria P75, P25 P75, P25 P75, P25 P90, P10 P75, P25 P75, P25
FE: sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls: tariff changes No No Yes No No No
Observations 191 191 191 234 191 191
R2 0.23 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.33 0.36
Notes: Constant terms and the variables ROIj,∆T Ij ,∆T
O
j are included but not reported. All columns are
weighted with Canada’s share in US imports of intermediate goods in industry j. a indicates significance
at the one percent level, b indicates significance at the five percent level and c indicates significance at the
ten percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the sector (SIC 2-digit) level.
experienced comparatively less exit.
In column (3), we further control for tariff changes, including both input and output
tariffs changes from 1987 to 1992, and our results remain very similar to those in column
(2). The results are also quite robust to adopting less restrictive binding criteria in col-
umn (4). In column (5) we use a lower level of HHI for defining oligopoly industries,
and we can see that our results hold qualitatively but lose some significance for input
tariffs. When using an even lower HHI threshold in column (6), where more competitive
industries are now included as oligopolists, we can see that the results start to change
sign for input tariffs and none of the two coefficients of interest are significant. This
provides strong support for our theoretical predictions on firm entry being applicable to
industries with an oligopolistic market structure.
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5 Conclusion
Rules of origin in FTAs generate a degree of market segmentation that boosts the market
power of oligopolistic producers of intermediate goods, translating into higher markups
and higher prices even in the absence of decreasing returns to scale in production. We
should then expect to observe higher markups under a binding domestic content re-
quirement than they in its absence. In turn, domestic content requirements should be
more likely to be binding the tighter is the requirement, the smaller are MFN input tar-
iffs, and the larger are MFN output tariffs. These predictions are borne out by evidence
in Canadian export data and US PPI data.
As discussed in Section 3, these effects of ROOs on market power and markups im-
ply that origin requirements have the potential of generating efficiency costs that go
beyond those associated with the substitution of domestic intermediates for imported
intermediates by domestic producers (as measured by the trade-barrier equivalent ef-
fect of ROOs). These additional efficiency costs stem from inefficient firm entry (and
potentially inefficient selection of heterogeneously productive intermediate producers)
due to ROOs sheltering domestic oligopolists from foreign competition.
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A Proofs of theoretical results
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: Since Φ(τI) < 1, the ratio N/(N − 1) is greater than the ratio
N/(N −Φ(τI)), i.e. a binding content requirement results in a higher level of markup in com-
parison with the unconstrained case. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: LetΠ(p) = (M/N) (1− c/p) ((1+ τIσ)/(τI + τIσ))− F denote indi-
vidual profits, in an unconstrained scenario where all suppliers charge a price p, with c denoting
marginal cost; and let Πˆ(p, r) = (M/N) (1− c/p) (1+ r (τI − 1))/τI − F denote individual prof-
its in a constrained scenario at level r where all producers charge a price p. Also, for given input
tariffs, let r˜ = τIσ/(τI + τIσ) denote the regional value content under a common input price, p:
this is independent of p. Finally let pˆ(r) denote the equilibrium price under an RVC constraint
at level r.
It is easy to verify that Πˆ(p, r˜) = Π(p). Thus, in the absence of constraint, if all producers
were to charge a price coinciding with pˆ(r˜), profits would be the same with and without a con-
straint. Next, suppose that, absent a constraint, all producers charge a price pˆ(r˜), and consider
a unilateral price deviation by a single domestic producer, h. As pˆ(r˜) exceeds the unconstrained
equilibrium price, and since Πˆ(p, r˜) = Π(p), a downwards deviation in ph from pˆ(r˜) must but
profitable, and so the optimal price deviation, p∗h( pˆ(r)) = p
∗(r) must lie below pˆ(r˜). Denot-
ing the regional value content under such a deviation with rˇ
(
pˆ(r), p∗(r)
)
, homotheticity implies
rˇ
(
pˆ(r), p∗(r)
)
= rˇ
(
1, p∗(r)/ pˆ(r)
)
= r¯(γ∗(r)), where γ∗(r) = p∗(r)/ pˆ(r). The assumption σ > 1
implies r¯
(
γ∗(r˜)
)
> r˜, making a constraint at level r = r˜ slack under an optimal unilateral devia-
tion, which implies that an outcome where all producers price at pˆ(r) cannot be an equilibrium
under a binding constraint r = r˜. If the RVC requirement, r, equals or exceeds the level r > r˜
for which r¯
(
γ∗(r)
)
= r, on the other hand, unilateral deviations to p∗(r) = γ∗(r) pˆ(r) cannot
produce a switch to an unconstrained regime where r˜ > r. (A value r such this must exist by
continuity given that r¯
(
γ∗(r˜)
)
> r˜ and r¯
(
γ∗(1)
)
< 1.) In this case an outcome where all produc-
ers price at pˆ corresponds to an RVC constrained oligopolistic equilibrium outcome. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: This follows directly from (23) and (24). 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: For a given level of τI > 1, the equilibrium level of domestic value
content in the absence of an RVC constraint is ρ(p, τI pD). Setting τI = 1 (i.e. zero tariffs in
intermediate imports) and imposing an RVC constraint at the level r = ρ(p, τI pD) will thus
produce the same effect on the relative value of imported intermediates in total intermediates
use as imposing the tariff (τI > 1) does. As long at the RVC constraint is binding, however, the
expression for the markup under a binding RVC constraint, given by (22), is independent of r
and always greater than the corresponding expression (18) for any level of τI . 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: Equilibrium levels for markups and the number of firms can be
expressed as
N∗ =
M
F
µ∗ − 1
µ∗
1 + τIσ
τI + τIσ
; (33)
µ∗ =
σ
σ− 1
(
1− F
(1 + 1/τF) M
τI + τI
2σ
(1 + τIσ)2
)−1
. (34)
Nˆ∗ =
M
F
µˆ∗ − 1
µˆ∗
1 + (τI − 1) r
τI
; (35)
µˆ∗ =
σ
σ− 1
(
1− F
(1 + 1/τF) M
τI
1 + (τI − 1) r
)−1
. (36)
Examining the expressions (34) and (36), and letting K =
(
τI + τI
2σ)/(1 + τIσ)2, Kˆ = (1 + (τI −
1) r
)
/τI , we can see that Kˆ > K implies µˆ∗ > µ∗.
The denominator of the expansion of Kˆ− K is positive. The numerator equals
τI
(
1 + τIσ
)2 − (τI + τI2 σ)(1 + (τI − 1) r) ≡ A1.
Since σ > 1 and τI ≥ 1, this is monotonically decreasing in r, reaching a minimum at r = 1; and
so
A1 ≥ τI
(
1 + τIσ
)2 − (τI + τI2 σ)(1 + (τI − 1) r) ≡ A2.
Dividing this by τI , expanding and simplifying, we obtain:
A2
τI
= 1 + 2τIσ − τI ,
which is positive for σ > 1 and τI ≥ 1. The inequalities A1 > A2 and A2 > 0 imply A1 > 0. This
implies Kˆ > K and hence µˆ∗ > µ∗.
Comparing next (33) and (35), we can conclude that, since µˆ∗ > µ∗, a sufficient condition
for Nˆ∗ > N∗ is
(
1 + (τI − 1) r
)
/τI ≥
(
1− τIσ
)
/
(
τI − τIσ
)
. A sufficient condition for this to be
met is τI ≤
(
r/(1− r))1/(σ−1); this coincides with condition (10), a necessary condition for the
domestic content requirement to be binding. 
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B Further empirical results and robustness checks
Results for continuous ROO index
In Table B1 we report results for a variant of specification (29) in which the ROO dummy
variable is replaced by the continuous ROO index. These results are consistent with
those reported in Table 3.
Results for actually binding tariffs
The binding criteria we use in deriving the results of Table 4 are rather arbitrary and do
not necessarily reflect actual binding thresholds. To assess whether binding thresholds
differ across industries, we use specification (29) with industry dummy variables to run
a series of rolling regressions, using different input and output tariff thresholds. We
start with the most loosely defined one until we find the first threshold level that yields
a significant αˆ1.33 By doing so we could in principle determine tariff levels that are as
close as possible to actual binding tariffs.
We report detailed thresholds for each industry in Table B2. In our sample, most
industries have input tariff thresholds at around 3.5 percentage points (∆T I = 0.035),
implying that the difference between MFN and preferential rate for these inputs has to
be below 3.5 percentage points to make ROOs binding. Most industries have output tar-
iff thresholds at around 0.5 percentage point (∆TO = 0.005), implying that the difference
between MFN and preferential rate for the associated final goods has to be greater than
half of a percentage point in order for ROOs to be binding.
We then use these thresholds to check that our results are not driven by the industry
composition of our sample, but rather by the interactions between tariffs and the re-
strictiveness of content requirements. In Table B3 we report results from the same spec-
ification used in column (4) of Table 4 but interacted with industry dummy variables.
In column (1), when comparing across industries, we see results consistent with those
reported in Table 4 except for a few industries: Chemicals, Textiles and Transportation
for input tariffs, and Vegetables, Mineral Products, Stone and Glass, Transportation and
Miscellaneous for output tariffs. In column (2) we report results for a sub-sample where
tariffs are binding at the industry level, with missing coefficients implying that there
is no evidence of binding tariffs for a particular industry. Conditional on tariffs being
binding, the interactions between the ROO index and input tariffs are still significant ex-
cept for Foodstuffs, Chemicals, Textiles and Miscellaneous. The interaction between the
ROO index and output tariffs is significant, except for Vegetables. Intuitively, in those
industries where tariffs are actually binding for content requirements, changes in tariffs
do not account for higher price gaps.
To further investigate whether industry-level binding thresholds are relevant for
33We report results with separate rolling thresholds for input tariffs and output tariffs. Results with
joint thresholds do not vary much.
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Table B1: Rules of origin and export unit values: binding tariff thresholds and ROO
index
Strict Liberal
Dep. variable: ∆pitnc P50, P50 P50, P50 P50, P50 P50, P50 P25, P75 P75, P25
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DTB × ROIit 1.615a
(0.157)
1.641a
(0.158)
1.178a
(0.172)
1.191a
(0.174)
3.355a
(0.448)
0.62a
(0.127)
DTB −0.499
(0.04)
a −0.503
(0.041)
a −0.435
(0.042)
a −0.427
(0.043)
a −1.126a
(0.17)
−0.253a
(0.039)
ROIit −0.237a
(0.069)
−0.275a
(0.073)
−0.195a
(0.071)
−0.212a
(0.073)
−0.151b
(0.069)
−0.372a
(0.081)
FE: province×country No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
FE: country×time No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 63,813 63,813 63,813 63,813 63,813 63,874
R2 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
Notes: Country×product trends and the initial MFN tariffs as controls are included but not reported. All
columns are weighted with relative trade values of good i in year t between the US and the non-FTA
partner c. Binding thresholds are the same as in Table 3. a indicates significance at the one percent level,
and b indicates significance at the five percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the product×country
level.
Table B2: Actually binding ROOs: criteria
HS2 Industry Jointly binding
(
∆T¯ I , ∆T
¯
O)
01-05 Animal & Animal Products Output only (−, P25) = (−, 0.01)
06-15 Vegetable Products Yes (P75, P10) = (0.035, 0.005)
16-24 Foodstuffs Yes (P75, P50) = (0.035, 0.02)
25-27 Mineral Products No −
28-38 Chemicals & Allied Industries Yes (P75, P10) = (0.035, 0.005)
39-40 Plastics / Rubbers Yes (P75, P10) = (0.035, 0.005)
41-43 Raw Hides, Skins, Leather, Furs Yes (P75, P10) = (0.035, 0.005)
44-49 Wood & Wood Products Yes (P50, P10) = (0.02, 0.005)
50-63 Textiles Yes (P75, P10) = (0.035, 0.005)
64-67 Footwear / Headgear Not in sample
68-71 Stone / Glass Yes (P75, − ) = (0.035,−)
72-83 Metals Yes (P50, P10) = (0.02, 0.005)
84-85 Machinery / Electrical Yes (P75, − ) = (0.035,−)
86-89 Transportation No −
90-97 Miscellaneous Input only (P50, − ) = (0.02,−)
Notes: All Footwear / Headgear are consumption (final) goods and therefore are dropped from the main
sample.
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Table B3: ROO index and tariffs, by industry
Dep. variable: ∆pitnc (1) Full sample (2) Tariff binding
HS2-Industry ROIit × ∆T Iit ROIit × ∆TOit ROIit × ∆T Iit ROIit × ∆TOit
01-05 Animal & Animal Products −74.489b
(31.053)
154.989a
(22.207)
− 135.106b
(62.144)
06-15 Vegetable Products −13.097a
(4.8)
−14.841b
(32.313)
−11.699b
(4.932)
−17.33b
(6.907)
16-24 Foodstuffs −34.406a
(6.603)
56.242a
(10.735)
1.88
(6.374)
90.539a
(11.664)
25-27 Mineral Products −19.154a
(6.025)
−98.578a
(11.407)
− −
28-38 Chemicals & Allied Industries 0.845
(4.228)
20.277a
(4.008)
6.797
(4.762)
20.597a
(4.311)
39-40 Plastics / Rubbers −41.071a
(4.344)
35.863a
(4.612)
−37.952a
(5.137)
33.906a
(5.137)
41-43 Raw Hides, Skins, Leather, Furs −35.743a
(9.975)
37.331a
(8.499)
−40.51a
(11.092)
31.992a
(11.369)
44-49 Wood & Wood Products −9.732b
(3.858)
4.994b
(2.422)
−19.15a
(6.405)
4.928b
(2.764)
50-63 Textiles −2.331
(2.285)
6.475a
(2.348)
−1.261
(2.832)
6.312b
(2.659)
68-71 Stone / Glass −76.704a
(10.487)
11.199
(9.225)
−73.634a
(10.596)
−
72-83 Metals −6.409c
(3.78)
9.986b
(4.219)
−23.856b
(9.956)
20.077a
(6.397)
84-85 Machinery / Electrical −46.354a
(5.454)
14.845
(9.382)
−41.665a
(5.695)
−
86-89 Transportation 1587.508
(643.497)
−143.755
(114.894)
− −
90-97 Miscellaneous −215.546c
(128.024)
−83.395a
(32.313)
−442.151
(307.536)
−
Fixed effects: prov.×country + country×time prov.×country + country×time
Observations 63,813 41,405
R2 0.12 0.11
Notes: Industry dummy, country×product trends and the initial MFN tariffs as controls are included but
not reported. All columns are weighted with relative trade values of good i in yeart between the US and
the non-FTA partner c. a, b, and c indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Standard errors are clustered at the product×country level.
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Table B4: ROO index and tariffs, with tariff related binding dummy
Full sample Excl. non-binding Only jointly
Dep. variable: ∆pitnc industries binding industries
(1) (2) (3)
ROIit × ∆T Iit ×
(
DBI = 0
) −16.103a
(4.264)
−34.369a
(5.079)
−26.222a
(5.16)
ROIit × ∆T Iit ×
(
DBI = 1
) −11.717
(2.859)
a −12.201
(2.864)
a −9.879
(2.911)
a
ROIit ×∆TOit ×
(
DBI = 0
)
0.567
(4.387)
−13.742b
(5.415)
−17.083a
(5.445)
ROIit ×∆TOit ×
(
DBI = 1
)
11.926
(2.989)
a 12.568a
(2.988)
7.263
(3.073)
b
ROIit ×
(
DBI = 0
) −0.028
(0.136)
0.677a
(0.155)
0.503a
(0.159)
ROIit ×
(
DBI = 1
) −0.013
(0.113)
−0.028
(0.114)
0.378a
(0.109)
∆T Iit ×
(
DBI = 0
)
7.091a
(1.169)
9.835a
(1.351)
8.063a
(1.372)
∆T Iit ×
(
DBI = 1
)
5.299a
(0.825)
5.422a
(0.827)
4.641a
(0.81)
∆TOit ×
(
DBI = 0
) −4.739a
(1.566)
4.54b
(2.231)
9.291a
(2.238)
∆TOit ×
(
DBI = 1
) −3.625a
(0.936)
−3.397a
(0.938)
0.54
(0.911)
FE: province×country Yes Yes Yes
FE: country×time Yes Yes Yes
Observations 63,813 60,304 54,175
R2 0.07 0.07 0.06
Notes: The binding dummy, country×product trends and the initial MFN tariffs as controls are included
but not reported. All columns are weighted with relative trade values of good i in year t between the US
and the non-FTA partner c. a indicates significance at the one percent level, and b indicates significance
at the five percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the product×country level.
how content requirements are transmitted to prices, we run a variant of (30) that in-
cludes a dummy variable taking a value of one if tariffs fall into the binding criteria
(DBI = 1) and zero otherwise. These results are reported in Table B4, and show that
higher ROO index and higher input tariffs are associated with lower price gaps, and
that this finding applies to both binding and non-binding groups (see the first and sec-
ond rows in Table B4). Also, a higher ROO index and higher output tariffs are associ-
ated with higher price gaps, but this is only true when tariffs make ROOs binding (see
row 3 and 4). Our results remain robust in column (2), where we exclude industries
with non-binding ROOs (i.e. Mineral Products and Transportation) and, in column (3),
where we further exclude industries where ROOs are partially binding (Animal Prod-
ucts, Stone/Glass, Machinery and Miscellaneous).
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Table B5: Alternative samples or tariff measures
Excl. initial 1989-2000 WTO WTO output
Dep. variable: ∆pitnc tariffs above median longer sample output tariffs weighted tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ROIit × ∆T Iit −48.78a
(9.465)
−6.475a
(1.345)
−9.512a
(2.091)
−10.696a
(2.061)
ROIit ×∆TOit 25.773a
(4.4)
5.737
(1.027)
a −0.001
(0.001)
−0.019
(0.003)
ROIit 0.217c
(0.1276)
−0.08
(0.84)
0.191c
(0.107)
0.375a
(0.119)
∆T Iit 20.886
a
(3.045)
2.002a
(0.372)
4.797a
(0.662)
5.027a
(0.657)
∆TOit −8.832a
(1.349)
−0.409b
(0.165)
0.000
(0.0004)
0.005a
(0.001)
FE: province×country Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE: country×time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34,530 148,990 63,813 63,813
R2 0.1 0.06 0.06 0.06
Notes: Country×product trends and the initial MFN tariffs as controls are included but not reported. All
columns are weighted with relative trade values of good i in year t between the US and the non-FTA
partner c. a, b, and c indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. Standard
errors are clustered at the product×country level.
Results for alternative samples
In Table B5 we report results for alternative samples. In column (1) we show that our
results are robust to excluding products which had high initial MFN tariffs above the
median tariffs in our sample.34 This addresses a potential selection concern about in-
dustries initially protected by high tariffs being more likely to lobby for tight ROOs. In
column (2) we show that our results are robust to a longer sample period of 1989-2000.
In column (3) we replace the MFN output tariffs with WTO tariffs (for US exports), and
hence the independent variable ∆TOit becomes the difference between WTO tariffs and
CUSFTA’s preferential rates. It is not surprising that the interaction term for output tariff
gaps becomes insignificant. Intuitively, CUSFTA’s rules of origin are more likely to be
binding when US producers need to meet content requirements for exporting final prod-
ucts to Canada with preferential rates. What matters for the market power of Canadian
exporters of intermediate goods are therefore the preferential rates relative to Canada’s
MFN rates. Our results suggest this is indeed the case, and that how other WTO mem-
bers levy tariffs on US products is of no consequence. In column (4) we use weighted
WTO tariffs instead and find very similar results.
34Excluding tariffs higher than the 90th or 95th percentiles does not qualitatively change the results.
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Table B6: Alternative fixed-effects specifications
Dep. variable: ∆pitnc
binding + differentiated (1) (2) (3) (4)
ROIit × ∆T Iit −46.852a
(5.525)
−26.056a
(6.29)
−48.69a
(5.179)
−14.683c
(7.839)
ROIit ×∆TOit 33.033a
(4.03)
7.79b
(3.297)
33.617a
(3.658)
11.354a
(3.796)
ROIit 0.135
(0.192)
−8.409a
(1.575)
0.443b
(0.19)
−10.098a
(1.903)
∆T Iit 9.431
a
(1.435)
3.023
(2.088)
5.391a
(1.378)
0.008
(2.753)
∆TOit −5.647a
(1.544)
1.221
(1.489)
−2.36
(1.489)
−0.024
(1.662)
FE: province×country Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE: country×time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra FEs prov.×coun.×time prov.×product ind.×country prod.×prov.×coun.
Observations 19,871 19,871 19,871 19,871
R2 0.13 0.48 0.19 0.69
Notes: Country×product trends and the initial MFN tariffs (dropped in column (4) due to collinearity) as
controls are included but not reported. All columns are weighted with relative trade values of good i in
year t between the US and the non-FTA partner c. a, b, and c indicate significance at the one, five, and
ten percent levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the product×country level.
Results for alternative fixed-effects specification
In Table B6 we check whether our results remain robust to using alternative fixed effects
as further controls (recall that our main specification controls for province×country and
country×time fixed effects). In doing so, we run our main specification (30) with a
sub-sample of differentiated goods where tariffs are binding at the industry level (as
defined in B2). In column (1), we add province×country×time fixed effects to control
for province-destination specific and time-varying cost shocks. In column (2) we add
province×product fixed effects to further control for province specific quality gaps be-
tween FTA and non-FTA products. In column (3) we include industry×country fixed
effects to take into account other cost factors that may be specific to an industry (at SICT
1-digit level). In column (4) we report results with province×product×country fixed
effects to account for country specific tastes for a specific province×product pair. All
these results are in line with those reported in Table 4.
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